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We show that policies that eliminate corruption can depart from socially desirable poli-
cies and this ineciency can be large enough to allow corruption to live on. Political
competition between an honest (welfare maximiser) and corrupt politicians is studied.
In our model the corrupt politician is at a distinct disadvantage: there is no asymmet-
ric information, no voter bias and voters are fully rational. Yet, corruption cannot be
eliminated when voters have heterogeneous preferences.
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Corruption is the misuse of public oce for private gains. It leads to the misallocation of
talent, technology and capital and thereby hinders economic growth (e.g. Mauro 1995). The
problem of corruption is enormous and its cost is estimated to be around 5% of the world
GDP (UN, 2008).1 Yet, so far the Political Economy literature has only partially uncovered
its driving forces and some puzzling questions remain unanswered.
Why does corruption persist in many democracies in the developing world? Why does
political competition often fail to eliminate corruption, why do voters not elect politicians
who are not corrupt? In previous models, corruption often emerges through the introduction
of voter bias (e.g. Dixit and Londregan (1996), Myerson (1993, 2006), Besley and Coate
(1997), Pani (2011)) or asymmetric information and poor institutions (e.g. Ferejohn 1986,
Tirole 1996, Persson et al 1997, Caselli and Morelli 2004, Besley and Smart 2007, and Besley
2006 for a survey and some independent results, Schwabe 2011). These modelling features
naturally allow an opportunistic politician to extract rents. We study an environment where
these features are absent, because we think they often appear insucient to explain the
observed cross-country variation of corruption.
Exogenous voter bias is meant to capture some dimension of social division (e.g. ide-
ological, ethnic, religious, cultural, etc). However, social demarcation is a feature of most
countries and therefore it is dicult to see how this could explain the dierent levels of cor-
ruption across countries. For instance, consider ethnic division, arguably one of the most
pronounced and rigid social demarcations: while it is prevalent in many countries where
corruption is rampant (e.g. India, Nigeria), it is also present in countries where corruption
is barely detectable (e.g. Belgium, Canada or Switzerland are well-known examples from
the developed world).2 Moreover, poorly informed voters too (i.e. asymmetric information)
could only provide partial explanation to the existence of corruption: there is ample evidence
that in countries where corruption is virulent voters often elect / re-elect politicians who are
known to be corrupt and criminal (Kurer 2001, Manzetti and Wilson 2007, Aidt et al 2011,
Banerjee et al 2012).3 Indeed, unpopular corruption and popular corrupt politicians is a
widely observed paradox (Kurer 2001, pp. 63).
We show that as long as voter preferences are heterogeneous, corruption cannot be en-
tirely eliminated. Furthermore, if income inequality is suciently high, the corrupt politician
can win the majority of votes. These results hold despite the fact that we analyse a frame-
work where the classic drivers of corruption discussed above (i.e. voter bias and asymmetric
information) are absent. We analyse political competition between an honest (welfare max-
imising) and a corrupt politicians in a model of proportional representation in government,
1Although widely cited in World Bank, IMF, OECD documents and by others, the accu-
racy of this gure has been questioned (see more on Matthew Stephenson's Global Anticorruption
blog: https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2016/01/05/its-time-to-abandon-the-2-6-trillion5-of-global-gdp-
corruption-cost-estimate/).
2Perhaps more importantly, even when a society is deeply divided and hence voter bias plays a major role
in elections, it is dicult to explain why political competition within the social (e.g. ethnic) group does not
eliminate corruption: in principle, each group should be able to oer to voters a non-corrupt alternative with
the same political platform.
3For instance, in India, a fourth of the members of the previous lower house of the national parliament
faced pending criminal charges (Dutta and Gupta 2012, Chemin 2011).
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where politicians share power and implement policies according to their vote shares.4 The
reason for our modelling choice of governing is twofold. First, in many cases the losing party
can inuence policy (for instance, in legislative-executive bargaining (USA), as part of the
governing coalition, via supporting a minority government or supporting laws requiring su-
permajority). The extent and success of this inuence is usually in proportion of the losing
party's electoral support, so we believe our model describes most parliamentary systems well.
Second, we wanted to avoid the workhorse model of probabilistic voting. Probabilistic voting
models introduce exogenous popularity or voter bias (or both), which lends market power to
corrupt politicians, and this naturally allows for rent extraction. Because our paper focuses
on why corruption exists, we found the framework that avoids these biases more compelling.
In this paper, we show that corruption can never be eliminated as long as voter preferences
are heterogeneous. There are two crucial driving forces behind our results. First, it is
not always in the interest of the welfare maximising honest politician to ght corruption.
In order to sway voters from the corrupt politician, the honest politician needs to oer a
platform which matches the corrupt politician's oer and thereby deviate from the socially
desirable (rst best) political platform. The gain from eliminating corruption does not always
justify the cost of choosing a socially suboptimal political platform. Second, even when the
honest politician would prefer eliminating corruption, she cannot possibly please everyone
and therefore in equilibrium there are always voters who vote for the corrupt politician.
Interestingly, in both of these cases the corrupt politician can even win the majority: because
the honest politician cares about voter welfare, she wants to adopt the preferred policies of
the average voter and when the income distribution is suciently skewed (inequality is high
enough and thus the minority (the rich) has a disproportional eect on total welfare), the
honest politician will have a minority vote share.
While our model is static, we believe the mechanism we uncover could help explain the
persistence of corruption over time. The history of fuel price subsidies is a case in point. For
instance, in Nigeria fuel subsidies were introduced in the 1980s with the objective to help
the poor. While fuel subsidies were ineective to alleviate poverty, they had disastrous eect
on the economy. The direct cost of these fuel subsidies has been large: the World Bank
estimated that it varied between 1-5% of the GDP (depending on oil prices) and accounted
for 10-25% of the federal budget (IMF 2013, Siddig et al 2015). But the real burden is the
indirect cost: fuel subsidies were the major source of corruption, which cost 22% of GDP
in 2014 and it was estimated that this cost could rise up to 37% of GDP by 2030 (PWC
2016). Yet, the subsidies were popular among the poor and over the last 30 years numerous
governments made a number of attempts to remove them without success. This example
highlights one of the major mechanisms in our model: a well-meaning government can be
forced to implement (or preserve) suboptimal policies that may foster corruption in order to
reduce the voter base and limit the power of corrupt politicians.
4There are many articles where the implemented policy is the result of some compromise or power sharing.
For instance, in Alesina and Rosenthal (2000) two parties reach a compromise on policy as a result of
executive-legislative interaction, as is often the case in the USA. In coalitional bargaining games (e.g. Austen-
Smith 2000, Baron and Diermeier 2001), one party is often selected to propose a policy with probability equal
to vote share (for empirical evidence, see Diermeier and Merlo 2004). We adopt a simple reduced form of
policy implementation similarly to e.g. Grossman and Helpman 1999, Saporiti 2014, Herrera et al 2014,
Xefteris and Ziros 2017 to capture the idea that in practice the winner does not take it all.
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2 Literature review
In many earlier studies corruption emerges in equilibrium because voters are assumed to have
a bias towards particular candidates (see Persson and Tabellini 2000 for a detailed survey).5
Much of this literature builds on the seminal article of Dixit and Londregan (1996) which
identies the basic trade-o between voters' anity for politicians and economic benets: a
politician can aord to deliver less benet to voters (e.g. shirk, be less smart or more cor-
rupt) when voters are biased toward her. Higher levels of voter bias naturally results in more
corruption and in the absence of a bias corruption disappears.6 In seminal works, Myerson
(1993, 2006) analyses the eectiveness of dierent electoral systems in preventing parties with
known corruption levels to win legislative seats, when parties exogenously belong to two ide-
ological camps (dierentiated by a policy question). Myerson focuses on strategic voting and
shows that the least corrupt party may not be selected due to a coordination failure among
voters. Some studies use so-called citizen-candidate models, where a citizen, if elected, is not
bound by electoral promises and implements his own preference as policy. A voter prefers
the candidate whose preference is closer to hers, i.e. voters again have an exogenous bias for
political candidates. In this setup, voters may vote for a less competent (e.g. Besley and
Coate 1997) or corrupt (Pani 2011) politician despite their intrinsic preferences if politicians
are unable to commit to the policy preferred by the majority. In our model, politicians can
commit to their electoral promises, there is no voter bias, so our voters make their voting
decisions based only on politicians' oers.
Other studies focus on the importance of institutional framework. For example, Persson
et al 1997 argue that without checks and balances political constitutions are incomplete
contracts and hence they leave scope for corruption. Following on this literature, Acemoglu et
al 2013 argue that corruption can persist, because voters may dismantle checks and balances
when checks and balances also allow the elite to inuence politicians by non-electoral means.
In contrast, in our model institutions play no role, voters accept some level of corruption
because the corrupt politician can appeal to some voters with a proposal that the honest
politician does not rationally want to match.
Another strand of literature introduced asymmetric information between voters and politi-
cians, which naturally allows the politician to extract private rents (e.g. Ferejohn 1986, Tirole
1996, Persson et al 1997, Caselli and Morelli 2004, Besley and Smart 2007, and Besley 2006
for a survey and some independent results). These models suggest that low income may fos-
ter corruption because the asymmetric information problem is more severe due to the facts
that poor people tend to be less educated and also have more limited access to information
about candidates. However, the models of these studies are unsuitable to investigate why
corruption exists when voters know (as opposed to know something about) the politicians.7
Previous work more related to our paper include papers where voters knowingly vote
5There are two major strands of the literature, one on corrupt bureaucrats and one on politicians. The
models on corrupt bureaucrats is very dierent from that of corrupt politicians, because bureaucrats are not
elected (for a survey see e.g. Banerjee et al (2012)). In what follows, we focus on corrupt politicians.
6The studies of voter bias (e.g. ideological, ethnic or popularity) are akin to models of oligopolies where
rms extract rents through their market power.
7In Caselli and Morelli (2004) corruption may persist even under perfect information because high quality
candidates, whose opportunity cost of being a politician is higher, do not run for oce if the payos from
oce are suciently low.
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for corrupt politicians. For example, in Aghion et al 2010 voters willingly choose corrupt
political intervention in countries where trust is scarce. The reason is that voters prefer to
have an institution in place that allows for economic activities in the absence of trust, even
if this institution extracts rents from voters. The setup of their paper is dierent to ours
because we assume that voters can choose to elect non-corrupt politicians. Also related in
this literature is Evrenk (2011), who considers a model with voter bias where a clean and a
corrupt politician compete in an election and as part of their manifesto they can choose to
eliminate corruption. In his study, although politicians could eradicate corrupt institutions,
both the corrupt and non-corrupt politician have an incentive to preserve corrupt institutions,
because these institutions provide rents to the corrupt, but also a competitive advantage to
the clean politician. However, in Evrenk (2011), the clean politician is not welfare maximising
as the honest politician is in our study.
3 The environment
There are two politicians competing in an election: an honest politician denoted by h (hence-
forth referred to in the feminine form) who maximises voters' welfare and an opportunistic
(corrupt) politician denoted by c (henceforth referred to in the masculine form) who max-
imises his own rent. There is no asymmetric information, voters know which politician is
honest and which one is corrupt. Political competition can be characterised by two political
dimensions b and G. We think of these two dimensions as two dierent public goods.
Let I denote the set of voters with cardinality N = |I|. Voters, who are indexed by i, can
have two income levels y ∈ {0, y}: α ∈ (0, 1) portion of the population is poor with income
normalised to 0 and 1−α portion is rich with income y ∈ (1,∞). To simplify the framework,
we assume that the tax rate is 100%, so all income is collected and to be redistributed
and/or invested in public good(s) by the state. This means that the budget is equal to Nµ,
where µ = (1 − α)y is the average income. Importantly, voters are heterogeneous in their
preferences over b and G. In particular, a voter with income y has utility b + Gy, where
b and G represent the average spendings on the two public goods.8 This utility function
implies that rich voters prefer G over b, while the poor would rather have the state spend on
b than on G.9 Prior to election, the corrupt and the honest politicians make promises (bc, Gc)
and (bh, Gh), respectively, where, for instance, bc is the per voter spending on public good b
promised by the corrupt politician. After election politicians receive a portion of the budget
and consequently make good on their promises according to their power, i.e. equilibrium
8A public good is both non-excludable and non-rivalrous. Most goods that governments provide, however,
are rivalrous to some extent: for instance, the individual utility of a bridge is aected by congestions and
larger population requires larger police force to provide the same level of protection. Therefore, to us it seems
more appropriate to dene individual utilities as a function of average, rather than total, spending. Note
that if we were to adopt the notion of a pure public good, we would only need to multiply the individual
utilities by N (so Nb+NGy), which would simply lead to our welfare function (see equation (2) below) being
multiplied by N too. Clearly, this would not aect any of our results.
9One may wonder why income enters the voter's utility function when the tax rate is 100%. The reader can
think of the 100% tax rate as a simplication of the concept of very high redistribution, where not all income
is collected. Alternatively, income can also be substituted with wealth in the utility function. What matters
for the analysis that follows is voter heterogeneity, the source of heterogeneity is of secondary importance.
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vote shares.10 That is, if the corrupt politician has a vote share s ∈ [0, 1] in equilibrium,
then he receives s portion of the budget (i.e. sNµ) and delivers only s portion of his total
promises (i.e. sNbc and sNGc).
11 We do not allow for debt and hence a politician cannot
promise more than the budget: µ ≥ bp+Gp, p ∈ {c, h}. Thus, a voter with income y receives
in equilibrium total utility sbc + (1− s) bh + (sGc + (1− s)Gh) y.12 If nh and nc other voters
vote for the honest and corrupt politicians respectively (so N = nh + nc + 1), then a voter































Simple rearrangement yields that a fully rational voter will always vote for the corrupt
politician if he oers more: bc +Gcy > bh +Ghy. The intuition behind this result is simple:
regardless of how other voters vote, it always pays to vote for the oer that the voter prefers,
because by doing so the voter can always (marginally) increase the weight on this oer, which
increases his utility in equilibrium.13
In what follows, we focus on the case where the average income µ > 1 and hence the
average voter will prefer G to b.14 We assume that if voters are indierent between the
corrupt and honest politician, they then favour the honest politician, so the honest politician
10Consider for instance the 2017 UK general election as a recent example of a party gaining access to the
portion of the budget despite its minority share of votes: the Democratic Unionist Party won only 10 out of
the 650 seats in the parliament and yet secured an extra ¿1bn from the budget for Northern Ireland for their
support of the Conservative government (Northern Ireland had already received more than a fth more public
spending per head than the UK-wide average). In general, there are many reasons why a winning party would
like to strike a deal with the (minority) opposition: laws requiring supermajority, rebels in the winning party,
thin majority, or simply increasing legitimacy (e.g. in 1994 in Hungary while the post-communist socalist
party (MSZP) won a comfortable majority with 54% of seats, it decided to form a coalition) to name a few.
11There is considerable evidence that in practice politicians keep their promises, see e.g. Thomson et al
(2018).
12In principle, one could introduce uncertainty over voter preferences and recast our model of proportional
representation in a majority voting system (probabilistic voting), where the probability of winning would
be a function of politicians' strategies. This model would be akin to our proportional representation model
with continuous income distribution, where vote shares depend on strategies. See more on the model with
continuous income distribution in the Discussion section.
13Similarly to our model, in Alesina and Tabellini (1990) voters are heterogeneous and assign dierent
weights to two public goods: in their model voter i's utility depend on γ (i) b + (1− γ (i))G, where 0 ≤
γ (i) ≤ 1. Note that assuming γ (y (i)) = 1/1 + y (i), our voters' utility depend on the two public goods in
the same way as in Alesina and Tabellini (1990).
14µ > 1 implies that the honest politician will prefer to spend the entire budget on G. It is, however,
immaterial in our analysis whether the honest politician prefers a policy that favours the rich or the poor.
What is important is that the honest politician has a clear policy preference and the corrupt politician (who
doesn't) exploits this. We believe our choice of setup is a good representation of reality. First, the rich is
often thought to be more productive than the poor (e.g. through their ownership of productive assets, scale of
assets (e.g. land ownership), access to better education and healthcare, greater gender inequality among the
poor etc). Therefore, a politician solely concerned with average utility (and thus productivity by implication)
will want to invest public funds according to the preferences of the rich (for instance, by building motorways).
Second, corrupt politicians often target the poor in practice because they are more numerous, easier to please
and more responsive to vote buying. Third, as Pande (2008) points out, the poor often prefers candidates
from their own rank, and poor politicians tend to be more susceptible to grafts. Lastly, the current setup
closely corraborates our example of fuel subsidies in Nigeria, where the arguably optimal policy is to abolish
fuel subsidies, despite the poor insisting on it.
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only needs to match the oer of the corrupt politician to win all the votes. We formally
dene the objective functions of the politicians below: average voter welfare is the utility
function of the honest politician and per voter corruption is the prot function of the corrupt
politician, where corruption is equal to the budget allocated to the corrupt politician minus
his spending on public goods, respectively:
W V (bh, Gh; bc, Gc) = (1− s (bh, Gh, bc, Gc)) bh + s (bh, Gh, bc, Gc) bc
+ ((1− s (bh, Gh, bc, Gc))Gh + s (bh, Gh, bc, Gc)Gc)µ (2)
πc (bc, Gc; bh, Gh) = s (bh, Gh, bc, Gc) (µ− bc −Gc) (3)
To summarise the timing of the game: rst, politicians make their oers (bc, Gc) and
(bh, Gh); second, voters vote for the politicians; third, voter incomes are taxed 100% and
the budget Nµ is divided between the corrupt and honest politicians according to their vote
shares (i.e. sNµ and (1− s)Nµ, respectively); fourth, the corrupt and honest politicians
make good on their promises in proportion of their vote shares, i.e. they deliver (sNbc, sNGc)
and ((1− s)Nbh, (1− s)NGh), respectively.
Politicians can make the following promises: b ∈
{




0, µ− b, µ− b, µ
}
,
where 0 < b < b < µ.15 The set of G is dened such a way that no matter which b the
honest politician chooses, she is able to exhaust her budget, i.e. spend the rest of her budget
on G. We believe this simple discrete strategy space captures the most essential features of
political competition, because political campaigns and the resulting budget commitments are
organised around priorities and the nature of the public good often exogenously determines
the possible levels of spendings.16 One could think of our discrete strategy space as in a
politician's manifesto a public good (e.g. b) may have 'no importance' (b = 0), 'low priority'
(b = b), 'high priority' (b = b), or 'the highest priority possible' (b = µ). See more on the
strategy space in the Discussion section.
Therefore, we analyse a normal form game in which the set of available actions to both












.17 The game is for-
mally dened as follows
Γ = 〈I ∪ {c, h} , {∪i∈I {c, h} , S, S} ,
{×i∈I {×i∈I {c, h} × S × S → R} ,×i∈I {c, h} × S × S → R,×i∈I {c, h} × S × S → R}〉
We make the following assumption that we maintain throughout the paper.
Assumption 1. The dierence between political platforms b and b is suciently large:
in particular, b (y − 1) /y > b.
15For other papers with discrete strategy space, see e.g. Aragones and Thomas (2000) or Chen and Eraslan
(2017).
16For instance, in the 2015 UK electoral race, there were three possible levels of one of the key budgetary
commitments, the renewal of Britain's only nuclear deterrent weapon system, the four Vanguard-class sub-
marines armed with Trident II missiles: no renewal was represented by SNP, UKIP, and the Green Party;
partial renewal (i.e. three submarines) by Labour and Liberal Democrats; and full renewal (i.e. four sub-
marines) was promised by the Conservatives.






















We show in the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix that the 10x10 game Γ can
be reduced to a 3x3 game (see Figure 1). If Assumption 1 holds, then the reduction is
through the elimination of strictly dominated strategies, so the equilibria that we identify
and analyse in the 3x3 game are in fact unique in their respective parameter regions. However,
if Assumption 1 does not hold, then some of the strategies that are eliminated would only
be weakly dominated.
In what follows, we investigate three possible parameter regions:18 b̃ < b < b, b < b̃ < b,
and b < b < b̃, where
b̃ ≡ αµ
2
µ− 1 + α
=
α (1− α) ȳ2
ȳ − 1
(4)
It is easy to see that b̃ is always 0 < b̃ < µ when µ > 1 and thus it divides the interval
[0, µ] into two segments. The rationale for distinguishing these two segments is that b̃ is the
trigger value for the honest politician to act against the corrupt politician. In particular, if
the corrupt politician plays any action (bc, Gc) such that bc > b̃, then the honest politician
does not try to match this oer, i.e. she does not try to challenge the corrupt politician and
nds it optimal to play the socially desirable strategy bh = 0, Gh = µ. We summarise this
observation in the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. If the corrupt politician plays an action (bc, Gc) such that bc > b̃, then the best
response of the honest politician is not to match this oer, i.e. the honest politician does not
try to challenge the corrupt politician and plays (0, µ).
To see why this is true, observe that in the absence of a rival, when µ > 1 the honest
politician would prefer in principle to spend the entire budget on G (i.e. she would set b = 0
and G = µ), and thus would take a political platform which the rich prefer. This is because
average welfare b + µ (µ− b) is maximised at b = 0 when µ > 1. The best response of the
honest politician to the corrupt politician's strategy (bc, 0) is then
19
BRh(bc, 0) =
 (bc, µ− bc) for 0 < bc < b̃(0, µ) for b̃ ≤ bc
This is because, on the one hand, if the honest politician matches the oer of the corrupt
politician, she wins all the votes and thus average welfare (her prot) is equal to bc+µ (µ− bc).
On the other hand, when the honest politician does not try to match the oer of the corrupt
politician and consequently wins only the votes of the rich, average welfare is αbc+(1−α)µ2.
Clearly, she pursues the latter strategy as long as bc + µ (µ− bc) ≤ αbc + (1− α)µ2 or
bc ≥
αµ2
µ− 1 + α
=




18We analysed the more general setting of continuous strategy space (i.e. when b,G ∈ [0, µ]) with continuous
income distribution and in that setup some of the basic features were the same as in our model: there was
a pure strategy equilibrium and a region where only mixed strategy equilibrium existed, and we could also
show that in both types of equilibria corruption was strictly positive. However, we could not characterise the
mixed strategy equilibrium in this more general setup.
19Note that it is sucient to investigate the honest politician's best response to the corrupt action (bc, 0)
where bc > b̃, because if the best response to this action is (0, µ), then (0, µ) remains the best response to all
actions (bc, Gc), where bc > b̃ and Gc > 0.
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(1− α) (µ− b)µ
Figure 1: Reduced Game: actions constitute support of 3x3 MSE (in bold: 2x2 MSE)
4 Results
We show in the Appendix that the 10x10 game Γ can be reduced to a 3x3 game through the
elimination of strictly dominated strategies (Reduced Game, see Figure 1). That is, in any
equilibrium, each politician may use only three actions. In particular, the corrupt politician
does not want to waste resources to please the rich (Gc = 0) when targeting the poor and




or (b, 0). Furthermore,
the corrupt politician may target the rich by playing (0, µ− b). The honest politician will
naturally play the socially desirable platform (0, µ) and in order to sway poor voters she may
also play two other actions that match the corrupt politician's high or low oer of b, while




or (b, µ− b), respectively).
We identify three possible equilibria: a pure strategy equilibrium, and two mixed strategy
equilibria where the politicians mix over two or three strategies. In what follows, we call these
mixed strategy equilibria 2x2 and 3x3 mixed strategy equilibrium, respectively. The three
equilibria correspond to three dierent parameter regions (see Figure 2) As discussed above,
we distinguish three possible scenarios along possible values of b and b and show that the
type of equilibria depends on these parameter values.
Case when b̃ < b < b: Pure Strategy Equilibrium
In Lemma 1 we established that for all (bc, Gc) such that bc > b̃ the honest politician's best
response is (0, µ). The best response of the corrupt politician to the honest action (0, µ) is to
oer Gc = 0 (because the honest politician's oer to the rich cannot be outbid) and oer the
lowest possible strictly positive amount on b, which is b > b̃, because any bc > 0 would win
over the poor. It then follows that the equilibrium in pure strategies is simply bc = b,Gc = 0
and bh = 0, Gh = µ.










2x2 Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
3x3 Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
Pure Strategy Equilibrium
Figure 2: Parameter regions for equilibria, black rectangle: b < b̃ < b (α = 0.2, µ = 1.5)
yields positive prot for the corrupt politician is higher than the trigger value b̃. That is,
bc = b > b̃means that corruption is not too large and thus defeating corruption (i.e. matching
the corrupt politician's oer and winning all votes) results in relatively little welfare gain
compared to the welfare loss, which stems from deviating from the socially desirable political
platform (i.e. bh = 0, Gh = µ).
It is instructive at this stage to think through why this pure strategy equilibrium exists.
Consider the pure strategy equilibrium above. In general, why cannot the honest politician
deviate and oer the equilibrium payo to voters plus a bit more and get all the votes? That
is, consider the oer b̂h = sbc+(1− s) bh+ε, Ĝh = sGc+(1− s)Gh, where s is the vote share
of the corrupt politician and (bc, Gc) and (bh, Gh) are the politicians' original oers in the
equilibrium outlined above. In this case all voters would be strictly better o if they voted
for the honest politician and ε would be nanced by the money that the corrupt politician
would have stolen otherwise. However, this deviation would not be protable: if the honest
politician were to make this oer poor voters would still vote for the corrupt politician. Recall
that all voters rationally choose the politician whose oer is better, simply because by voting
for (and thereby increasing the weight on) the better oer, they increase their utility (see
relation (1)). Indeed, when bc > bh, then bc > b̂ = sbc + (1− s) bh + ε for ε suciently small,
so this oer would not sway poor voters. Poor voters would vote for the honest politician
if and only if her oer of b is equal to (or higher than) bc, because only then it would make
sense for poor voters to put more weight on (i.e. vote for) the honest politician's oer. This
oer, however, would not be optimal from a welfare perspective as we have shown above,
hence the existence of the pure strategy equilibrium.20
20In other words, when bc > bh while it is true that all voters would be better o by voting for the honest
politician who oers (b̂h, Ĝh), it is also true that given the oer (b̂h, Ĝh) poor voters are even more better o
by voting for the corrupt politician. Given this voter behaviour the deviation (b̂h, Ĝh) does not pay.
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Case when b < b̃ < b: a 2x2 and 3x3 Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
It also follows from the above discussion that when there is a political platform b ∈ (0, b̃),
then there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. To see this, consider the following: when
bh = 0, Gh = µ, the corrupt politician can win the poor votes by any oer b > 0. Naturally,
he wants to maximise his rents and thus oers the lowest b > 0, which is b and plays (b, 0).
But then the honest politician wants to oer bh = b,Gh = µ− b (note b < b̃ and Lemma 1),




, because he would then win the
poor votes (b < b) while he is still able to extract rent (b < µ). But then the honest politician
would of course rather play bh = 0, Gh = µ (because b̃ < b and Lemma 1).
Therefore, in what follows we look for equililibria in mixed strategies. As we show below,
there can be two mixed strategy equilibria when b < b̃ < b, depending on whether b ≥ C (b),
where
C (b) ≡ αµ
3 (µ− b)− (1− α) (µ− 1) b2
µ2 (µ− 1 + α)− (µ2 − 1 + α) b
(5)
The function C (b) determines two regions in the rectangle dened by the inequalities
b < b̃ < b and depicted in Figure 2. We show that when b ≥ C (b) there is 2x2 mixed strategy
equilibrium, i.e. politicians mix over two actions, and when b < C (b) politicians mix over
three actions, i.e. the mixed strategy equilibrium is 3x3. The next proposition identies the
two equilibria when b < b̃ < b; Figure 1 depicts the actions played with positive probability
in the 3x3 and the 2x2 (in bold) mixed strategy equilibria and the payos. (All proofs are
relegated to the Appendix)
Proposition 1. 2x2 Mixed Strategy Equilibrium: If b < b̃ < b and b ≥ C (b), then the unique
Nash Equilibrium of the game is in mixed strategies. In equilibrium, the corrupt politician




with probabilities p and 1− p, respectively,
and the honest politician mixes between (0, µ) and (b, µ− b) with probabilities q and 1 − q,
respectively, where
p =





3x3 Mixed Strategy Equilibrium: If b < b̃ < b and b < C (b), then the unique Nash
Equilibrium of the game is in mixed strategies. In equilibrium, the corrupt politician is mixing




with probability p2, and (0, µ− b) with probability 1 −
p1 − p2, where






























+ (1− α) b







+ (1− α) b
)
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Case when b < b < b̃: 3x3 Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
We show in Lemma 2 in the Appendix that C (b) > b̃, which then implies that C (b) > b when
b̃ > b. Therefore, in this parameter region we only have the 3x3 mixed strategy equilibrium
identied in Proposition 1.
Before we discuss the wider implications of the game, it is helpful to develop a deeper un-
derstanding of the basic driving forces and the underlying structure of these three equilibria.
4.1 Analysis of the equilibria structure
As discussed before, pure strategy equilibrium exists when the political platforms are such
that even when oering the lowest available political platform b to the poor the corrupt
politician is forced to pay out a considerable portion of his budget (b̃ < b), and thus corruption
is limited. As a result the honest politician does not want to challenge the corrupt politician
in this case, because welfare considerations dictate that she ignores corruption and represents
the socially desirable platform (0, µ).




, then the corrupt politician who
wants to minimise the payout to voters will play it. But this leads to too much corruption
and thus prompts the honest politician to challenge the corrupt politician, i.e. to deviate
from the socially desirable platform (0, µ) and oer bh > 0 in order to sway poor voters from
the corrupt politician. As argued above, this results in two possible mixed strategy equilibria.
Next, we derive some comparative statics of the 2x2 mixed strategy equilibrium in order
to shed some light on the mechanics of the two mixed strategy equilibria.

























The simplicity of the 2x2 mixed strategy equilibrium stems from the fact that if b is high





, hence the support of her mixed strategy consists only of the socially
desirable action (0, µ) and the action (b, µ− b) that matches and challenges the corrupt





he can still win the poor when the honest politician tries to appease them by playing (b, µ− b).
However, note that in this case any bc > b would sway voters to the corrupt politician, so
higher b is essentially a redistribution from the corrupt politician (∂πc(2x2)/∂b < 0) to the
voters (∂W V(2x2)/∂b > 0). As b decreases corruption is increasing, which in turn increases the





to the poor. Indeed, when b is suciently low, i.e. b < C (b), the honest




with positive probability to match the




too. But the honest politician's increasing eort to
match the corrupt politician's oers and lure the poor comes at a price: she ends up playing
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the socially desirable platform (0, µ) less often (q1 < q). This opens up the possibility for
the corrupt politician to win over the rich and make a prot that way instead: the corrupt
politician starts to play (0, µ− b) with positive probability. This results in a 3x3 mixed
strategy equilibrium.
After discussing the equilibria structure and the basic mechanisms of the game, now we
turn to the wider implications of our model.
4.2 Main results: properties of the equilibria
The most important result of our model is that corruption, i.e. the rent of the corrupt
politician, can never be entirely eliminated:
Proposition 3. Corruption is always strictly positive.
The proposition suggests that as long as there is heterogeneity in voter preferences, there
is always corruption, even when voters can vote for a benevolent politician. In our model,
corruption is not a result of asymmetric information or voter bias, it is solely the result
of voter heterogeneity. Consequently, when heterogeneity in voter preferences disappears, so
does corruption. For instance, when the country is rich and all voters have income y > y > 1,
then everyone prefers G to b and thus there is no corruption. Our model highlights the
simple observation that a (well-meaning) politician cannot possibly make everyone happy
and therefore there are always voters whose preferences can be eectively represented by an
opportunistic politician.
Proposition 1 suggests that the honest politician's equilibrium strategy in the 2x2 mixed
strategy equilibrium does not depend on α directly, while α does have a direct eect on the
corrupt politician's equilibrium strategy. If inequality increases ceteris paribus (i.e. α and y





more often in equilibrium, despite the fact that the honest politician would still
mix with the same probabilities. This is because for larger α the welfare loss is bigger when
the honest plays (0, µ), so in order to make the honest politician indierent, the corrupt needs
to reduce the honest politician's payo from playing (b, µ− b) by playing (b, 0) less often.
This suggests that the corrupt politician benets from increasing inequality.21 We dene
an increase in inequality as a simultaneous increase in α and y such that average income
µ = (1− α) y remains xed. Note that in our model this is the only way inequality can be
varied.22
Proposition 4. In the pure strategy and the 2x2 mixed strategy equilibrium, higher inequality
ceteris paribus results in higher expected vote share of the corrupt politician, higher total
corruption and lower voter welfare.
In this model, the primary source of corruption is voter heterogeneity. Therefore, it is
perhaps not too surprising that if voter heterogeneity is more pronounced, i.e. inequality
21Empirical studies (e.g. Apergis et al 2010, Chong and Gradstein 2007, Glaeser and Saks 2006, You and
Khagram 2005) often nd that corruption and inequality are positively correlated.
22If we allowed y > 0, then there would be other ways to vary inequality. We thank the referee for pointing
this out.
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is higher, so is corruption. Proposition 4 implies that in two countries where the average
incomes are equal, but in one of them the rich are fewer (but richer), then in that country
the corrupt politician has a higher expected vote share and corruption is also higher on
average. Voter welfare also decreases with inequality. However, inequality has an ambiguous
eect in the 3x3 mixed strategy equilibrium. This is because in this equilibrium the corrupt
politician wins the votes of the rich with probability (1− p1 − p2) (1− q1 − q2), so he prots
from the voter bases of both the poor and the rich.
The honest politician is solely concerned with voter welfare as opposed to power per se.
Power (i.e. vote share) only concerns her to the extent that it aects welfare. This means
that the honest politician lets the corrupt politician win the majority in all three equilibria
under certain circumstances (i.e. parameter values). We give the intuition for this result for
the case of the 2x2 mixed strategy equilibrium. In principle, the honest politician should
be worried about the corrupt politician winning the majority: the higher α the higher share
of the budget the corrupt politician has in equilibrium. However, this is counteracted by
two other eects. First, when α is high, so is b̃, which means that b is relatively close to µ.
Second, when α is high the corrupt politician is so keen to win the votes of the poor that




with higher probability (as α → 1, p → 0). This in
turn means that the welfare loss from corruption is relatively low, and it does not justify a
strategy where the honest politician would play the socially optimal platform less often in
order to win the majority (in expectation).23
5 Discussion
We employ a discrete strategy space with two interim points (b and b). Two interim points
are sucient to understand the equilibria structure of the game. Fundamentally, the honest
politician can either ght corruption (i.e. try to match the corrupt politician's oer in a mixed
strategy equilibrium) or don't ght corruption and choose the socially optimal platform (pure
strategy equilibrium). As we show above, this characterisation of the honest politician's
behaviour is linked to two intervals in the action space [0, µ] (see Lemma 1 and the denition
of b̃). Thus, two interim points are sucient to explore politicians' behaviour within as well
as across these two intervals and let us characterise some important features of the political
game.24
For a general income distribution with cdf F (y), everyone with income y < 1 will still
prefer b to G, because for these voters b will have a higher marginal utility than G, and
similarly voters with income y > 1 will again prefer G to b. So for all practical purposes
there will be two income classes as before. However, with a more general income distribution
vote shares (i.e. what is α in our model) would depend on strategies (in particular: b, b)
and this complicates the analysis. The honest politician would still face the fundamental
decision of ghting or not ghting corruption. That is, there would still be parameter values
23Interestingly, in the 3x3 mixed strategy equilibrium, the corrupt politician can win the majority even
when the majority is the rich (i.e. α < 1/2): when b = 0.1, b = 0.05, µ = 1.5 and α = 0.2, then C (b) ≈ 0.651
and b̃ ≈ 0.643 (and so b < b < b̃ < C (b), thus we have the 3x3 mixed strategy equilibrium) and the corrupt
politician's (expected) equilibrium vote share is 0.596.
24Adding more actions to the discrete strategy space or even allowing for a continuous strategy space will
of course change the equilibrium mixing distributions, but will not change the equilibria structure.
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(i.e. b, b) such that her best response is the socially optimal platform (0, µ). However, the
case when she decides to ght corruption would be more complex, because depending on
parameter values (i.e. b, b), and the vote shares these parameters imply (given F (y)), she
may only choose to reduce the vote share of the corrupt politician.25 But this just means that
with continuous income distribution, we will probably nd more instances when corruption
is strictly positive. In sum, with continuous income distribution the corrupt politician will
nd it easier to maintain a strictly positive vote share.
Calculating the mixed strategy equilibria with continuous strategy spaces (i.e. b,G ∈
[0, µ]) would be signicantly more complicated. When strategy spaces are continuous, the
expected prot functions are piecewise linear with multiple peaks and this suggests that the
support of the mixed equilibria should consist of discrete points, similarly to our model.
However, if one politician is mixing over, say, bi and bi, then the other wins all votes with
probability one by mixing over bi+ε and bi+ε (with ε > 0 innitesimal). This instead suggests
that the support of the mixed strategy equilibria contains continuous sections, which adds
considerable complexity to the fact that the mixed equilibria are over two dimensions (b and
G) and hence the mixing distribution is a joint distribution.26
We cast our model in the framework of proportional representation in a reduced form
fashion (similarly to e.g. Grossman and Helpman 1999, Saporiti 2014, Herrera et al 2014,
Xefteris and Ziros 2017), because in most political systems the winner does not take it all.
However, one could introduce uncertainty over voter preferences and recast the model in a
majority voting system, where the probability of winning would be a function of politicians'
strategies.27 This model would be akin to our proportional representation model with contin-
uous income distribution, where vote shares depend on strategies. However, if the strategy
space is continuous, then certain parameter regions would still only have mixed strategy equi-
libria and the complexity of calculating these equilibria discussed in the previous paragraph
would prevail.
The model in this paper is laid out in the context of corruption. Rents, however, can
also be understood more generally as some form of inecient government spending (see the
discussion in Persson and Tabellini 2000, section 4.2). For instance, the model could be
presented in the context of lazy politicians, where the opportunistic politician maximises
leakage µ − bc − Gc in order to reduce eort: the less of the budget needs to be spent
productively (i.e. on bc, Gc), the less eort is required from the politician.
25For instance, in our model, if the corrupt politician oers, say, (b, 0), then the honest politician will
never want to change from the socially optimal platform (0, µ) to (b, µ− b), because it would not increase her
vote share and would strictly decrease welfare (indeed, the only sensible alternative response is (b, µ− b), in
which case the corrupt politician would end up with zero vote share). With continuous income distribution,
however, (b, µ− b) can turn out to be an optimal response, if the associated increase in her vote share (which
depends on the income distribution) is suciently large.
26Assuming continuous income distribution in addition would lead to continuous expected prot functions,
but this would not solve the issue discussed above and not help characterising the mixed strategy equilibria.
Results on the pure strategy equilibrium with continuous strategy spaces and continuous income distribution
are available upon request.
27The results of this model would then be qualied in terms of the level of uncertainty, which we nd
unappealing. First, this uncertainity is hard to measure and consequently the qualied results of the model
would be dicult to empirically verify. Second, we wanted to avoid models with voter bias for reasons
discussed in the Introduction.
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There is a large literature on fractionalization (see e.g. Pande 2008), where fractional-
ization is often incorporated in the model as exogenous voter bias. On the one hand, our
model is distinct from this literature because our voters are not biased, they make their
voting choices solely based on politicians' oers. On the other hand, fractionalization can
of course be the source of voter heterogeneity and thus our ndings could apply to the case
of fractionalization too. In countries, such as India where the cast system prevented social
mobility for centuries, incomes, preferences and also voter support of social classes have been
entrenched. Our model speaks to this literature and highlights that this historical voter bias
can be the result of voter heterogeneity, creating a vicious circle and leading to developmental
trap: low income people support ineective policies (directly voting for corrupt politicians
and indirectly forcing honest politicians to adopt ineective policies), which in turn preserves
inequality and inecient social structures.
6 Conclusion
We conclude that policies that eliminate corruption can depart from the socially desirable
policies and this ineciency can be large enough to allow corruption to live on. The present
paper provides a mechanism that could help explain why corruption persists in some democ-
racies even when voters are fully rational, show no bias for corrupt politicians, there is no
asymmetric information and there is an honest, welfare maximizing politician who in prin-
ciple could eliminate corruption by matching the corrupt politician's oer. We show that
in the presence of voter heterogeneity, the corrupt politician can always nd voters whose
interests he can eectively represent and who will vote for him. Moreover, when inequality
is high enough, i.e. heterogeneity is prominent, the corrupt politician can win the majority
of votes as the honest nds it optimal to cater to the minority.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
First, we show that the 10x10 game Γ can be reduced to a 4x5 game (see Figure 3) through
the elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Next, we show that this 4x5 game can
be further reduced to a 3x3 game (see Figure 1) through again the elimination of strictly
dominated strategies. We then identify the equilibria in this 3x3 game.
It is immediate that the honest politician's actions when the total budget is not spent
will be strictly dominated by actions when her budget is fully exhausted, because oering
more (weakly) increases vote share and (strictly) increases voter welfare. Thus, her action
set Sh = {(b,G) ∈ S|b+G = µ} consists of only 4 actions (see Figure 3) that she may play
with positive probability in an equilibrium.
Furthermore, the corrupt politician's actions which exhaust his budget fully and thus
leaves him with zero rent against every honest action are also strictly dominated. First, note
that given Assumption 1, the second and the third conditions written in the last column of
Figure 3 hold (Assumption 1 implies the second, and the second implies the third condition).
This means that against all four honest actions in Figure 3 (i.e. all (b,G) ∈ Sh) there is at
least one corrupt action in Figure 3 that yields strictly positive payo. Therefore, a mixed
strategy that mixes over the ve corrupt actions in Figure 3 yields strictly positive payo
against all honest actions and thereby strictly dominates all corrupt actions that yield zero
against all honest actions (i.e.
{






). Thus, we will
restrict our attention to the following ve corrupt actions: Sc = {(b,G) ∈ S|b+G < µ}).
The resulting game with action sets Sc, Sh we call the Original Game and it is depicted
in Figure 3.
In what follows, we show that through the iterated elimination of strictly dominated
strategies the 4x5 in Figure 3 can always be reduced to the 3x3 game in Figure 1. In
particular, the following three actions can be eliminated in the Original Game above:
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, which holds since µ > 1 (note also that even if 1) in the table fails to hold(
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ii) (0, µ− b): By Assumption 1, conditions 2) and 3) hold (condition 3) is implied by
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Corrupt Honest πc W V Provided:(
0, µ− b
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(0, µ) 0 µ2












µ 1) (µ− b)y > µ
(0, µ− b) (0, µ) 0 µ2
(b, µ− b) 0 b+ (µ− b)µ(
b, µ− b
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+ (1− α) (µ− b)
]
µ 2) (b− b)y > b
(µ, 0) (1− α) b αµ+ (1− α) (µ− b)µ 3) (µ− b)y > µ
(b, 0) (0, µ) α (µ− b) αb+ (1− α)µ2






















































(µ, 0) 0 µ
Figure 3: Original Game (πc: payo to corrupt politician; W V : payo to honest politician)
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is strictly dominated by a strategy mixing (with




and hence it can be eliminated.




is strictly dominated by a strategy mixing between





probability1 − p − ε and hence it can be eliminated. Clearly, this mixed strategy





and (b, µ− b). It remains to show that this mixed strategy also
pays better against the honest strategy (0, µ). In particular, we need to show that




> b − b = (µ − b) − (µ −




> (1− p) (µ − b). Note that for any µ > b there exists a




> (2− p− ε)κ and also clearly
(1− p)µ > (1− p) (µ − b). To complete the proof observe that there always exists
a high enough p such that (2− p− ε)κ > (1− p)µ, because rearranging yields p >
(µ− (2− ε)κ) / (µ− κ) and (µ− (2− ε)κ) / (µ− κ) < 1.
Thus, a 3x3 game results, see Figure 1. In what follows, we show that there can be two
mixed strategy equilibria in this 3x3 game when b < b̃ < b: one when the politicians mix
over two actions and one where they mix over 3 actions (henceforth 2x2 and 3x3 mixed
strategy equilibrium, respectively). Before we turn to the derivations of these mixed strategy
equilibria, we prove that the two parameter regions that the two mixed strategy equilibria
correspond to, always exist, i.e. the 2x2 or 3x3 region alone never covers entirely the black
rectangle in Figure 2 dened by the inequalities b < b̃ < b.
Lemma 2. When b < b̃ < b, there are always two parameter regions, one where b ≥ C (b)
and one where b < C (b), where C (b) is dened in (5).
Proof. There is always a region where b ≥ C (b), because for e.g. b = 0 or b = b̃, C (0) = b̃ < b
and C(b̃) = b̃ < b, respectively.
To prove that there can be b̃ < b such that b < C (b), it suces to show that b̃ < C (b):
b̃ ≡ αµ
2
µ− 1 + α
<
αµ4 − αµ3b− (1− α) (µ− 1) b2
µ2 (µ− 1 + α)− (µ2 − 1 + α) b
≡ C (b)
First, observe that the denominator on the RHS is always positive: µ2 (µ− 1 + α) > (µ2 − 1 + α) b
certainly holds if µ2 (µ− 1 + α) > (µ2 − 1 + α) b̃ or (µ− 1 + α)2 > α (µ2 − 1 + α); that is,
µ2 − 2µ (1− α) + (1− α)2 − αµ2 + α − α2 > 0 ⇔ (1− α) (µ− 1)2 > 0. Therefore, we
can crossmultiply with the denominators to get
αµ2
(
µ2 − 1 + α
)
> αµ3 (µ− 1 + α) + (1− α) (µ− 1) b (µ− 1 + α)
After some rearrangement, this yields
αµ2 (1− α) (µ− 1) > (1− α) (µ− 1) b (µ− 1 + α) ⇔ b̃ > b
which holds by denition.
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2x2 mixed strategy equilibrium
Next we show that when b ≥ C (b), where C (b) is dened in (5), the equilibrium is 2x2.
First, let's calculate the mixed strategy equilibrium in the 2x2 subgame, when in equilibrium





and 1 − p, respectively, and the honest politician mixes between (0, µ) and (b, µ− b) with
probabilities q and 1− q, respectively (See actions in bold and the corresponding payos in
Figure 1). The honest politician mixes to make the corrupt politician indierent, that is,




→ q = µ− b
µ− b
Clearly, 0 < q < 1, where the last inequality follows from b > b. The corrupt politician










p (b+ (µ− b)µ) + (1− p)
(
αb+ (1− α) b+ (1− α) (µ− b)µ
)
which after some rearrangement yields
p =
(1− α) b (µ− 1)
αµ (µ− b)
Clearly, 0 < p < 1, where the last inequality follows from (1− α) b (µ− 1) < αµ (µ− b)↔
b < αµ2/ ((1− α) (µ− 1) + αµ) ≡ b̃, which holds by denition.
Next, we show that when b ≥ C (b) neither politician wants to play their third strategies
with positive probabilities in equilibrium in Figure 1. In particular, the honest politician's
equilibrium payo from the 2x2 mixed strategy equilibrium calculated above is (see the details
of the derivation in the proof of Proposition 2):











against the corrupt politician's equilibrium mixed






















which after some further rearrangement yields:
−αµ4 + αµ3b+ (1− α) (µ− 1) b2 + b (µ2 (µ− 1 + α)− (µ2 − 1 + α) b)
µ (µ− b)
> 0
The denominator is clearly positive (µ > b) and so is the numerator when b > C (b).




, the corrupt politician
never wants to play (0, µ− b), because it yields zero, i.e. it is strictly dominated.
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3x3 mixed strategy equilibrium
When b < C (b), then the two politicians are mixing over all three of their respective strategies
in Figure 1 with strictly positive probabilities. For brevity, we omit the derivations of the
mixing probabilities, but we prove they are all strictly between 0 and 1. The corrupt politician




with probability p2, and (0, µ− b) with
probability 1− p1 − p2, where

























The proof consists of a sequence of steps organised in a particular way for convenience of
exposition: step 1: p2 > 0, step 2: p1 + p2 < 1, step 3: p2 < 1, step 4: 0 < p1 < 1, step 5:
p1 + p2 > 0.
Step 1 : p2 > 0. We proceed by dividing this step into two parts. First, assume that




α(µ2−b) > 0, where the rst inequality is implied by α ∈ (0, 1) and the second
inequality also holds because α(µ2 − b) > b(µ − 1) ↔ b̃ > b, which holds by assumption.
Moreover, µ > 1 and µ > b > b imply (µ − 1)(b − b) > 0 and µ(µ − b) − (b − b) > 0 and
thus p2 > 0 as required. Second, assume that b− µ(b− b) < 0. In order to show that p2 > 0
we proceed by showing that both the numerator and the denominator of the expression of
p2 are negative. In the (rst) expression of p2 (7), the numerator is clearly negative when
b − µ(b − b) < 0. Now, to prove that the denominator in the (rst) expression of p2 (7) is
also negative we need to show that
(1− α)(b− µ(b− b)) + α[µ(µ− b)− (b− b)]




On the LHS, multiply both the denominator and numerator by minus one and then
cross-multiply to get
(1− α)µ(µ− b)(µ(b− b)− b) < α(µ2 − b)(µ(µ− b)− (b− b),
and then rearrange
b <
(1− α)µ2(µ− b)b+ α(µ2 − b)(µ(µ− b) + b)
(1− α)µ(µ− b)(µ− 1) + α(µ2 − b)
.
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Since b < C (b), the inequality above clearly holds if the RHS is larger than C (b); this is
what we show next, that is:
(1− α)µ2(µ− b)b+ α(µ2 − b)(µ(µ− b) + b)














+ b = C (b)
Cross-multiply, rearrange and simplify by dividing through µ(µ− b) to get:
[





























(1− α) [µ(µ− b)(µ− 1)− b]
which after multiplying through by µ2 − b yields(
(1− α)b+ α(µ2 − b)
)
(µ− 1)µ(µ− b) > (1− α) (µ(µ− b)(µ− 1)− b)
(
αµ2 − b(µ− 1 + α)
)
and then(
α2(µ2 − b) + (1− α)bµ
)
(µ− 1)µ(µ− b) > −(1− α)b(αµ2 − b(µ− 1 + α)).
Notice that on the RHS αµ2 − b(µ − 1 + α) > 0 because b̃ > b and thus the RHS of
the inequality above is negative while the LHS is positive. This means that whenever the
numerator is negative, so is the denominator, proving that p2 > 0 always.
Step 2: p1 + p2 < 1. We have that




















Similarly to Step 1 we consider two cases. First, assume that b − µ(b − b) > 0. Then
the denominator of p2 is positive as we showed in Step 1 and so substituting the (second)










































+ b = C (b)
which holds by assumption. Second, assume that b − µ(b − b) < 0. Now, both the
numerator and denominator of p2 are negative as we showed in Step 1. Using the second
expression for p2 again (8), multiply both the denominator and numerator with minus one
and then cross-multiply to get the same inequality as above. Thus, p1 + p2 < 1 as required.







Note that since α ∈ (0, 1), 1− b(µ−1)
α(µ2−b) < 1−
b(µ−1)
µ2−b , and this proves the step.
Step 4: 0 < p1 < 1. The rst part of the product in the expression of p1 (6) is between
0 and 1 because 0 < p2 < 1. The second part of the expression in (6) is also positive and
clearly smaller than 1 because α(µ2 − b) > b(µ− 1)↔ b̃ > b. This proves the step.
Step 5: p1 + p2 > 0. This follows from Step 1 and 4.
Lastly, it remains to show that the honest politician's mixing probabilities too all belong





with probability 1 − q1 − q2. It is convenient to rearrange the




/µ and λ ≡ (µ− b) /µ (thus




· (1− α) (1− λ)






(1− α) (1− λ)
(1− α) (1− λ) + αλ
,
1− q1 − q2 =
αλ
(1− α) (1− λ) + αλ
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Proof of Proposition 2
Before we derive the comparative static results we note that in equilibrium, the corrupt
politician obtains an (expected) prot:
πc(2x2) = α
(








and the equilibrium (expected) average voter welfare is equal to:




+ (1− p) (1− q)
(
αb+ (1− α) b+ (1− α)µ (µ− b)
)






b− b+ (1− q)µ (µ− b)
)
+ αb− (1− q) (1− α) b (µ− 1) + (1− α)µ2







Most of the signs of the derivatives in the proposition can be veried by inspection.
Furthermore, the second inequality follows because
∂W V(2x2)
∂b
= α− (1− α) b (µ− 1)
µ (µ− b)
> 0 ↔ αµ (µ− b) > (1− α) b (µ− 1) ↔ b̃ > b




(1− α) (µ− 1)
α (µ− b)2
> 0
Proof of Proposition 3
It is easy to verify that in the pure strategy equilibrium (when b̃ < b < b) per voter corruption





strictly positive. In the 3x3 mixed strategy equilibrium, per voter corruption is equal to
πc(3x3) = (1− p1 − p2)(1− q1 − q2)(1− α)b+ p1q1α(µ− b) + p2(q1 + q2)α(µ− b)
which after substitution and some tedious derivation simplies to
πc(3x3) =
α(µ− b)(1− α)b
α(µ− b) + (1− α)b
This expression is strictly positive too.
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Proof of Proposition 4
In the pure strategy equilibrium, the vote share of the corrupt politician is α, so his vote share
increases when inequality increases (i.e. α and y increase such that µ = (1−α)y is unchanged).
Similarly, per voter corruption πcPS = α (µ− b) increases and welfare W VPS = αb+ (1− α)µ2
decreases with α, ceteris paribus.
In the 2x2 mixed strategy equilibrium, the corrupt politician wins the votes of the poor
in all states, except when the corrupt politician plays (b, 0) (with probability p) and the
honest politician plays (b, µ− b) (with probability 1 − q). Thus the expected vote share of
the corrupt politician in the 2x2 mixed strategy equilibrium is
α (1− p (1− q)) = α−






This expression is increasing in α for any xed µ, so the higher the inequality (i.e. the higher
α and y such that µ = (1 − α)y is unchanged), the higher the expected vote share of the
corrupt politician is.
When increasing α and y such that µ = (1− α)y is unchanged the expected prot of the
















− µ2 + b < 0
This is negative if and only if b < µ (µ− b)+b. To see this observe that b < µ (µ− b)+b↔(
b− b
)
/µ (µ− b) < 1, and then ∂W V(2x2)/∂α < b (µ− 1)−µ2+b < 0, where the last inequality
follows when again b < µ (µ− b)+b. Lastly, note that b < µ (µ− b)+b always holds, because
b − b < µ − b < µ (µ− b). Thus more inequality yields more overall corruption and lower
voter welfare.
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